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THE rise of "the factory system" was a major economic devel-
opment of the nineteenth century. Increase in scale of
operations, detailed division of labor, intensified geographi-
cal concentration of industry, and mechanization of produc-
tion are just a few of the many processes which the historian,
of whatever school, cannot fail to record. Yet the nineteenth
century witnessed only the infancy and youth of the factory.
Manufacturing continued to grow, and its techniques to
develop, well into the twentieth century, reaching a stage
which some observers have called "maturity." It is upon this
recent part of its history, beginning with 1899, that the
present report on America's factories is concentrated.
Two of the more significant indexes of manufacturing
growth are output or physical product, and employment
or number of workers actually occupied in turning out the
product. A third measure, the ratio of employment to output,
that is, the amount of labor required to produce a unit of
goods, is an especially vivid indicator—when observed at
various points in time—of the transformation of the manu-
facturing process. Since we cannot describe the tightly woven
pattern of manufacturing development in all its aspects we
choose to trace the course, from the turn of the present cen-
tury, of these major strands.
GROWTH AND STAGNATION
IN EMPLOYMENT
In 1899, a prosperous year, five million persons earned a live-
lihood in American factories. Of these, about nine tenths 8'4 MANUFACTURING EMPLOYMEN1
were wage earners, and the remainder were white-collar
workers (including corporate officers), and entrepreneurs
(Chart 1). By 1937, the latest year of peak business preced-
ing the current war boom, the number of persons engaged in
Chart .1
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manufacturing industry had grown to ten million. In a little
less than four decades, therefore, the total number engaged
in manufacturing—again including salaried workers, cor-
porate officials and working proprietors as well as wage
Wage earners Salaried Proprietors and Total
employees firm membersCHANGES IN THE AGGREGATE 5
earners—had increased by 100 percent. This rise exceeded
the growth over the same period not only of the nation's
population, which went up 75 percent, but also of aggregate
employment in all branches of American industry (including
mining, trade, farming and other nonmanufacturing ac-
tivities), which rose 85 percent. Because of its more rapid rate
of increase, factory employment in 1937 accounted for a
somewhat larger proportion of all American workers and pro-
prietors than it had in 1899: at the close of the nineteenth
century its contribution to the total was 22 percent, as com-
pared with 24 percent some four decades later.
Within manufacturing itself there were several noteworthy
changes in the composition of employment. Wage earners,
whose numbers rose by a little more than 90 percent between
1899 and 1937, lost some ground to salaried or white-collar
workers, whose jobs increased by 250 percent. Entrepreneurs,
on the other hand, declined both in relation to the total of
manufacturing employment and absolutely: there were only
half as many factory proprietors in 1937 as there had been in
1899. Since wage earners constituted the great majority of all
persons engaged in factories over the entire period, the net
result of these shifts was a slight decline in their share of fac-
tory employment, from about 90 percent to 85. The rapid
multiplication of the number of openings for white-collar
•workers reflects the growing importance of supervisory, tech-
nical, and clerical functions in the manufacturing process. As
for the sharp decline in the number of proprietors and firm
members, it is attributable in large measure to the tendency
to incorporate partnerships and single proprietorships and in
part also to the growth of large-scale enterprise at the expense
of the small concern.
Returning to the 100 percent rise in total factory employ-
ment, we should note two outstanding characteristics of this
growth. In the first place, it was the result not of a cumula-
tion of steady increases from year to year but of varying6 MANUFACTURING EMPLOYMENT
annual rates of change. Even from the series based only on
Census years wide fluctuations are apparent (Chart 2). The
annual series for wage earners, estimated for intercensal
years, tells a more complete story. According to this record
there were absolute declines in employment during as many
as nine intervals, only one of which, the period 1929—32, ex-
ceeded a calendar year in duration. That spectacular slump
brought factory employment down to a trough that was
almost 40 percent below the 1929 average and 20 percent
short of the low levels of 1921 and 1914.
In the second place, the entire 100 percent increase in man-
ufacturing employment occurred during the first two decades
of the period 1899—1937. After the peak reached during the
war years 1917—18 there was no net gain in factory jobs. Up
to 1914 factory employment rose at a fairly substantial
average annual rate. Then came the upward spurt resulting
from war orders by European belligerents, followed by an
imperative domestic demand for factory-made munitions of
war—guns, uniforms, trucks, motor fuel, ships and airplanes.
Responding to these powerful stimuli, manufacturing em-
ployment in 1917—18 touched a peak that was not surpassed
in the, prosperous 1920's or in the, good business years 1937
and 1940. Translated into terms of human beings in the
labor market, this dispassionate digest of employment data
means that during most of the years in the first and second
decades of the twentieth century large numbers of youths
leaving school, women entering industry and immigrants
crossing our borders found new jobs in American factories, as
well as opportunities to fill places left by other workers.
While labor turnover continued on into the 1920's and
1930's, these years brought no important net increase in fac-
tory employment; newcomers found openings in manufac-
turing only when existing positions became vacant.
The current transformation of our industrial system into a
war economy is augmenting employment at a rapid pace,CHANGES
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very much as it did during the war of 1914—18. The clamor-
ous demands for workers are being met in part through ab-
sorption of those still unemployed (a reservoir less important
in 1914 than it was in 1939), in part through the diversion of
workers from jobs in other fields, and in part through a call
upon persons not normally employed. Already there is un-
mistakable evidence of this new upward trend. The latest
figures available at this writing indicate that in 1941 employ-
ment in American factories was 19 percent higher than in'
1937, and that it has climbed still further in 1942. It is likely
that opportunities for factory work will fall off again when
the present war has come to an end. But whether such a de-
dine will in fact occur, and if it does to what level and at
what rate it will proceed, must depend not only on economic
forces, many of which are still imperfectly understood, but
on political and other noneconomic factors as well.'
OUTPUT IN RELATION TO EMPLOYMENT
The foregoing section has sketched in brief the changes in
the number and composition of factory personnel since 1899.
At this point we take up a new thread in the pattern of man-
ufacturing development, and trace the growth of the product
turned out over the four decades by the army of workers that
swelled from five to ten million.
Factory output rose very sharply between 1899 and 1937.
Indeed, in absolute terms, the rise in output dwarfs the gain
in employment. By 1937 the physical product of our factories
had increased 276 percent, the number of employees only
100 percent.
Like the volume of employment, the course of output fluc-
tuated markedly. It is true that the cyclical fluctuations in
each were quite similar, as the timing of the peaks and
troughs in both output and employment shows (Chart 3).
I For some comments on the problem of forecasting the future of factory
employment, see Chapter 6.CHANGES IN THE AGGREGATE 9
But when successive peaks are compared, output is found to
have registered a series of more or less steady gains over em-
ployment. Except in three of the periods (1907—10,
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the years 1899—1903, 19Q3—07,
When employment declined in 1920—23 and
again in 1923—26 output continued to increase. And in
1918—20, when the movements of both were downward,the
drop in output was less severe than that in employment.
Especially noteworthy is the continued growth of factory pro-
duction during the 1920's to heights well above those of
Indexes of Output, Wage Earners Employed, and Totol Employed
Percentage





1916—18, whereas employment, as we have seen, did not sur-
pass the peak attained in the first World War until 1941.
The fourfold increase in output between 1899 and 1937,
while employment merely doubled, means that there was a
decline, during the 38 years, of 50 percent in the number of
workers employed per unit of product.2 The processed foods,
beverages, clothing, chemicals, metals, machines, carriages
and wagons, and the host of other factory products turned
out in 1899, were made with the aid of 5 million workers. In
1937, four times as large a bundle of goods—greatly changed
in composition, of course—was produced by only twice as
many workers.
Thus far we have considered only the size of the product.
If we could take statistical account of improvements in its
quality, we should almost certainly find that the 50 percent
decline in employment per unit is an understatement. For
the commodities processed in 1937 were, on the average,
superior to those made at the opening of the century.3
The measurable drop of 50 percent in the ratio of factory
employment to productequivalent to an average rate of
decline of 1.8 percent per annum for the period under dis-
cussion. Yet from an examination of Chart 4 it appears that
the rate of change in employment per unit of output was far
2Theratio between employment and output may be expressed either as the
number of men used in the production of a unit of goods, or as the volume
of product per man employed. The use of one form or the other is a matter
of choice.
•3Further, in many fields of manufacture a unit of output was made from
less material in 1937, thanks to the reduction of waste and the utilization of
by-products. That is, the net output of manufacturing industries (and itis
net output which is the better measure of the contribution of factories to our
national product) probably rose more rapidly than their gross output, because
of a slower rise in the input of materials. (For a discussion of the bias in in-
dexes of physical output, when they are taken to represent net output, see
Solomon Fabricant, The Output of Manufacturing Industries, 1899—1937
[National Bureau of Economic Research, 1940J, Ch. 2.)For this reason
the 50 percent cut in workers per unit of product is less than the reduction
that would be found in workers per unit of net output if we could measure
it adequately.CHANGES IN THE AGGREGATE 11
from uniform. There were short cycles as well as more per-
sistent differences from period to period. The year-to-year
movements are indicated only approximatelybecause the
figures for intercensal years are rather rough estimates.Yet it
is safe to conclude that there were 10 separate occasionsdur-
ing the last four decades when the number of workers em-
Chart 4
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ployed to turn out a unit of product increased, thus running
counter to the general trend. Over several rather long
periods, 1903—11, 1916—21 and 1929—36, this ratio tended
either to move horizontally or to rise. In the years 1911—16
and 1923—29, on the other hand, there were specially notable
declines in employment per unit.
One explanation of the fluctuations in the ratio of number
employed to goods produced is to be found, of course, in the
I
30
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modificationsin weekly hours of labor over the four decades
we are studying. In the following section the principal
changes in the working week are noted, and an attempt is
made to describe the rather complex effects of reduced hours
upon the output of factory workers.
REDUCTIONS IN THE WORK WEEK AND
THEIR RELATION TO EMPLOYMENT
PER UNIT OF PRODUCT
The changing ratio of workers to product may be regarded as
a function of the length of the work week and of the amount
of labor, measured in manhours, employed per unit of prod-
uct. If the number of manhours required to produce a unit
of output remains unchanged, a decline in hours worked per
man will raise the ratio of workers employed to output; con-
versely, if the length of the working week is unaltered, but
the number of hours of labor needed per unit of product is
reduced, employment will decline in relation to output. But
the two variables are not mutually independent, and it is
common knowledge that change in one tends to induce
change in the other. For this reason a movement upwar4 or
downward in the ratio of employment to output usually re-
flects both a change in weekly hours of work and a modifica-
tion of unit hourly labor requirements.
Reductions in the work week have occurred under varying
circumstances. Often a rise in the volume of goods turned out
per manhour has implemented the efforts of organized labor
to share in the benefits of the accompanying reductions in
costs by working less hours per week. Sometimes labor's cam-
paign to reduce hours of work has antedated a decline in real
costs and spurred the employer on to institute labor-saving
improvements; in such cases a cut in hours of work has been
a stimulus to the entrepreneur as well as a reward to the
worker. That a reduction in hours tends to lead to improve-
ments in methods of management, in machinery and in otherCHANGES IN THE AGGREGATE 13
factors, has been noted, for example, in a study of cotton
manufacturing by the National Industrial Conference Board.4
As N. I. Stone has observed, "the threatening diminution of
profits acts as a powerful stimulus to the owner or manager
of a plant who is anxious to make possible savings where be
was satisfied before to plod along in the established rut."
Occasionally the entrepreneurial reaction to reductions in
hours has been so prompt and far-reaching as to surprise the
trade union which initiated the demand for jt.6
Again, a widely prevalent reason for reduction in the hours
of labor—at least during the earlier part of the century when
the work week was very long—has been the experience, or
at least the presumption, that the average worker can actually
produce about as much in ten hours as in a twelve-hour day,
even with all other conditions of production unchanged.
Classic examples often cited are the experiences of the Engis
chemical factory near Liege in 1892, the Salford iron works
in Manchester in 1893, and the Zeiss optical plant in Jena in
1900. In all of these plants moderate reductions in hours per
day were accompanied by increases in output per manhour,
and in two by increases in output per. worker.7
In recent years reduction of hours has been strongly sup-
ported not as a means of sharing prosperity or effecting re-
4Research Report No. 4 (March, 1918).
5 "Is the Minimum Wage a Menace to Industry?" Survey, Feb. 6, 191g.
6 "The shorter work-week, as established by the thirty-five hour week, was
promptly met by employers with new labor-saving devices, a more intense
speed-up system of production and the establishment of the section system of
production in factories where it never existed before, thus tending to destroy
the immediate gains which were obtained by the thirty-five hour week. .-
(Resolutionadopted at the International Ladies' Garment Workers' conven-
tion in May 1937, cited by Harry Ober, Trade-Union Policy and Technologi-
cal Change [National Research Project, Philadelphia, 1940], p. 82.)
These and other cases are summarized in Josephine C. Goidmark's Fatigue
and Efficiency (Russell Sage Foundation, 1912). For more recent citations cov-
ering American industry see Harry Ober,cit., Ch. IV, and the 1940 Annual
Report of the Wage and Hour Division of the U. S. Department of Labor,
Ch. I. It is very difficult to determine from the cases described in these and
other sources the extent to which changes in factors other than hours of labor
affected labor productivity.14 MANUFACTURING EMPLOYMENT
ductions in costs, but in order to spread available employ-
ment among a larger number of workers and thus to help
absorb the unemployed.
Finally, throughout our country's industrial history much
effort has been devoted to putting a ceiling on hours of labor
in general, and in particular to restricting the number of
hours worked by women and children, and by men engaged
in hazardous occupations. Behind such regulation of hours
has been the consideration that despite the possibility of
immediate curtailment of production per employee, the
advancement of the health and happiness of the people at
large would counterbalance the loss in output, and perhaps
even lead ultimately to a stepping up of labor efficiency.
Whatever the grounds for reductions in the average length
of the work week, the statistical evidence, assembled from
rather fragmentary data and diverse sources,8 shows a definite
downward movement in number of hours worked during the
period since 1899. In that year the average full-time week
for all manufacturing was about 60 hours, whereas in the
years 1937—40, just prior to the acceleration of preparations
for war, the average work week was about 40 hours. The de-
cline in hours was slow during the first decade and a half,
and very slight during the 1920's. The largest cuts came
during and immediately following the war of 1914—18, a
period in which the full-time week fell from 55 to 50 or 51
hours, and again during the recent great depression, with
full-time hours declining from an average of 50 in 1929 to 40
in 1937-39.
The foregoing summary refers to the nominal work week.
Data on the number of hours actually worked, including
overtime and excluding undertime, are unfortunately less
reliable. Such as they are, however, they do indicate that the
trend in actual hours worked roughly paralleled the changes
in the normal or full-time week.
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Despite the general decrease in labor time per wage earner,
the number of workers used per unit of product declined
over the period as a whole. The employment-output ratio fell
by one half, while weekly hours of work declined by one
third. These are the end results, reflecting net changes over
four decades. If we follow the year-to-year fluctuations in the
employment-output ratio, we find that the number of workers
employed per unit increased during business recessions, when
hours were reduced temporarily to lessen the number of lay-
offs. Similar rises in employment per unit occurred also dur-
ing the first World War and in the 1930's when the work
week was cut drastically. Ultimately, however, we have seen
that these temporary upswings in employment per unit were
more than counterbalanced, resulting in long-term reduc-
tions in workers per unit.
To the 50 percent decline in workers per unit the one-
third cut in hours must itself have contributed by enhancing
labor's efficiency and stimulating managerial initiative. One
should not infer, however, that stated reductions in hours of
work have augmented workers' productivity at a constant
rate throughout the four decades that have elapsed since
1899. It is more than likely that a given cut in the working
day or week has had a progressively slighter effect upon labor
efficiency with the passage of time. For the reaction to a re-
duction in hours depends, first of all, upon the absolute
length of the working week that is cut. A 10-hour reduction
from an average of 60 hours per week (the prevalent working
period in 1899) will, as a rule, result in a greater increase in
labor efficiency than an equally large cut from a 50-hour week
(the average during the 1920's). Because of the downward
trend in hours, then, the influence on labor efficiency of
given reductions, and thus on labor requirements per unit of
product, must have diminished. The rate of diminution
would be all the greater if, as was the case, there were many
industries in 1899 with hours well above the average of 60.i6 MANUFACTURING EMPLOYMENT
whereas in 1937 industries clustered closely about the 40-hour
level.9
The level of hours is not the only factor, among those
affecting labor efficiency and unit labor requirements, that
changed during the past four decades. There was also an in-
crease in the kind of mechanization that lessens the relative
importance of labor intensity in the productive process: for
example, the widespread introduction of instrumental con-
trols, and a marked trend toward automaticity of machine
operation. With these changed characteristics of the factory
job itself, a given reduction in hours from a specified level
would have less effect on output than an identical reduction
from the same level under the old conditions of work. This
consideration lends added weight to the thesis that in the
earlier part of the century cuts in hours must have enhanced
labor efficiency and reduced unit labor requirements more
drastically than shortening of hours in the latter part of the
four-decade period. Unfortunately, no statistics are available
to measure the precise effect on labor requirements of
changes in these factors.
AGGREGATE MANHOURS AND
MANHOURS PER UNIT
Because of the reductions in hours of work, the course of
aggregate manhours of labor diverges from that of average
number of workers, as Chart 5 shows.'° The peak in man-
9 See Chapter 3, Table 2.
10Thedata on hours of labor relate to hours per week. It is not apparent
at first sight that multiplying the index of average number of workers em-
ployed by the index of weekly hours will yield an index of aggregate man-
hours worked during the year, for a question arises concerning changes in the
number of weeks worked per person per year. As we indicate in Appendix A,
however, in the computation of the average number of persons employed
account is implicitly taken of change in number of weeks per worker, and the
average number of workers so calculated is, in effect, the number of persons
that woutd be employed if all persons worked a full year; i.e., two persons
working half a year each are counted as one full-time worker.CHANGES IN THE AGGREGATE 17
hours before the present war boom
as did the high point in
whereas the latter series was only a
than in 1929 or 1937, the earlier war
out well above the heights reached
came during the war of
number of workers; but
little higher in 1917—18
level of manhours stands
in the subsequent years
Chart 5
ALL MANUFACTURING INDUSTRIES COMBINED











Based on Table F—I
1909 1919 1929 1939
shownin the chart. Again, the number of workers in 1937
was slightly higher than it had been in 1929; manhours,
in contrast, stood much lower in 1937 than in 1929. In
short, after 1918 wage-earner employment fluctuated about
11Thechart shows no 1917 or 1918 figure for manhours, owing to lack of
precise information on hours actually worked in those years. But it is safe to
say that the number of manhours was greater in 1917 a,nd 1918 than in 1919,
the highest figure plotted in the chart.i8 MANUFACTURING EMPLOYMENT
a horizontal trend; in manhours the trend was definitely
downward. As a consequence, the number of manhours
worked in factories in 1937 was no greater than it had been
thirty years earlier in the prosperous year 1907, although the
number of workers employed was substantially larger.
The preceding conclusion leads us to what is perhaps the
most striking figure in this report, namely the estimate of
the drop in manhour requirements per unit of fabricated
product during the 38 years following 1899. For a halving of
the number of workers employed per unit of product and a
one-third reduction of the working week amounts to a de-
cline of two thirds in the number of manhours employed
per unit of goods produced. And if improvements in quality
of products and savings of materials could somehow be
worked into the calculations we should find an even greater
cut in manhours per unit.
The two-thirds reduction in the ratio of manhours em-
ployed to quantity of product manufactured is the net result
of almost four decades of change. Like the employment-
output ratio, the ratio of manhours to output did not decline
smoothly, but shifted in tempo from one brief period to an-
other (Chart 6). Yet in comparison to the movement of
workers employed per unit, the fluctuations in manhours per
unit are relatively mild. The scarcity of data on actual hours
for each year since 1899, and the lack of precision in such
hours data as are available, make it difficult, of course, to
place' complete trust in such summary statements. It is pos-
sible that an abundance of reliable data would show more
fluctuations than does the series charted, although there can
be little question that the manhour-output ratios are much
more stable from year to year than the corresponding
employment-output ratios.
Despite this relative stability in the manhour-output ratio
several interesting changes occurred in its average rate of de-
cline. Here too the lack of complete and accurate data onCHANGES IN THE AGGREGATE 19
actual hours makes it hard to define the shifts. Nevertheless
one can conclude, first, that the five-yearperiod terminating
with the end of the first World War witnessed practically no
net decline in the manhour-output ratio.12Second, during
most of the 1920's there was an exceptionallyrapid drop in
Chart 6
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unit. The manhour-output ratio fell during
19—29 at a rate of more than 5 percent per
rapid rate of decline had prevailed during the
after 1899, unit labor requirements in 1939
12 Itseemslikely,though not certain, that manhours per unit fell consider-
ably from 1914 to 1915, dropped slightly from 1915 to 1916, rose sharply from
1916 to 1917, and went up slightly from 1917 to 1918. That is, the slow rate of
decline during the first World War..period was due entirely to the failure of
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would have been less than one half of what they actually were
in that year. Finally, the decline in labor per unit after 1930,
while much slower in pace than that which characterized the
1920's, was not very much behind the average for the entire
four decades.13
Chart 6 depicts also a fairly high degree of persistence in
the declining trend of manhours per unit. While we know
all too little about actual hours worked per week during the
years since 1899, it seems reasonable to conclude that the
years when there was no reduction in the manhour-output
ratio are relatively few. These years, interestingly enough,
were sometimes periods of growing business, in which output
and investment rose rapidly, and sometimes poor business
years, when output and investment fell off. Capital invest-
ment, widely considered one of the significant sources of de-
cline in unit labor requirements, has in fact fluctuated rather
violently,14 apparently without any noteworthy or even con-
13 Reference should be made again to a factor generally affecting our meas-
ures of output, namely, change in the quality of goods produced by factories.
On net balance there has been improvement: if we were to compare the prod-
ucts of American factories turned out in 1937 with corresponding goods
produced in 1899 the greater number of them would be found to be more
durable, more effIcient, less noisy in operation, or otherwise better. But such
comparisons might not lead to similar results if shorter intervals were consid-
ered. To the extent that there have been fluctuations in the rate of improve-
ment in the quality of fabricated commodities, some of the variation in the
rate of decline in manhours per unit of product may be accounted for, though
it is unlikely that the quality factors can explain a very large amount of this
variation. In particular, it is possible that improvements in quality were least
noteworthy, if not actually negative on the average, in the period following
1929. One reason for measuring only the net change between 1929 and 1937
and ignoring the years between is to eliminate as far as possible the effects of
cyclical changes in quality and other factors. But there is some ground for the
belief that the long recession following 1929 resulted in a deterioration of the
average quality of some goods, not entirely counterbalanced in the revival
that followed. Thus there seems to have been a tendency, especially in con-
sumers' semidurable goods like shoes and clothing, for factories to shift their
emphasis to the cheaper grades. Since these require much less labor in fabri-
cation than do the more expensive qualities or styles, the change in the char-
acter of output would be accompanied by a decline in the measure of man-
hours per unit even in the absence of other factors affecting this ratio.
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sistent effects on short-term changes in the manhour-output
ratio. The ratio dropped from 1920 to 1921 and again from
1929 to 1931, yet capital investment fell in both periods, in
the latter to a level actually below current depreciation
charges. But during 1923—29, another period when man-
hours per unit were declining rapidly, capital investment was
at a high level. It is surprising, also, that the period 1935—37
is to be counted among those in which there was no decline
in unit manhour requirements, for in these three years capi-
tal investment rose to heights comparable even with the level
of the boom period 1923—29.
One explanation lies in the difference between the current
flow of capital and changes in the existing stock of capital
goods. Even violent fluctuations in new investment cause
relatively mild changes in plant and equipment; and capital
goods do not actually decline until new investment falls
below the rate of wear and tear. Yet it is alone through
changes in the quantity and character of existing capital
goods that changes in new investment can exert a direct in-
fluence upon the ratio of labor to product.'5 And if a period
of adaptation (for reorganization or breaking-in) is necessary,
the labor-output ratio fails to react immediately even to fluc-
tuations in the volume of capital goods.
The relatively minor fluctuations in unit labor require-
ments—despite severe fluctuations in capital investment—may
be explained in part too by the customary removal from serv-
ice of less efficient equipment as output (and with it new
investment) declines, and its return when output (and new
investment) rises. Equipment set aside and then brought back
into use presumably requires more manhours of labor for
the production of a unit of output than equipment kept con-
tinuously in operation. An outstanding example is provided
15Changesin investment have indirect effects on the ratio through their
influence on the national output. This chain of relationships is too complex
to trace here.22 MANUFACTURING EMPLOYMENT
by the intermittent resort to beehive ovens in coke produc-
tion. These ovens yield half the product per worker that is
derived from byproduct ovens. As a consequence they have
been declining in importance ever since the introduction of
the byproduct oven during the 1890's and now contribute
less than 5 percent of total coke Yet during peaks
in coke output, the inefficient beehive ovens are restored to
use, only to be set idle again when output falls. The alterna-
tion of use and disuse of less efficient equipment thus helps
to offset the influence of fluctuations in new investment upon
the labor-output ratio.
Still another explanation of the comparatively steady
course followed by the manhour-output ratio is to be found
in the frequent utilization of factory labor to maintain old
machines and plant and sometimes even to construct new
plant and equipment. When investment in purchased capital
goods is declining, investment in capital goods produced by
the entrepreneur for his own use and for the maintenance
of old fixed assets is commonly decreased. At such times man-
hours expended in the latter types of investment activity are
Cut down, presumably more drastically than total manhours
of work. The consequence, in the absence of other influences,
is a drop in total manhours per unit of output during reces-
sion and a rise during recovery.16
16Thereverse seems to apply, however, in a few industries. Here it appears
that the need for maintaining plant and equipment even during depression
results in a smaller decline in maintenance labor than in total labor. This
situation, coupled with the inefficiencies of operation at low utilization of ca-
pacity, accounts in part for increases in manhours per unit during recession
and for decreases during revival. Modern steel mills, for example, are de-
signed for high-speed volume production, and when they are not operating
close to capacity they require excessive amounts of labor per ton of output:
the unit labor requirement per gross ton of finished steel products at a rate
of operation equal to 20 to 25 percent of capacity is 46 manhours as compared
with 34 manhours when 55 to 60 percent of capacity is utilized. (B. H. Topkis,
and H. 0. Rogers, "Man Hours of Labor per Unit of Output in Steel Manu-
facture," Monthly Labor Review, May 1935. For similar data on cement see
B. H. Topkis, "Labor Requirements in Cement Production," Monthly Labor
Review, Mar. 1936.)I
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Although the net effect of the various influences noted in
the preceding paragraphs is difficult to assess, variation in
the degree to which they offset one another may help to ex-'
plain the inconsistent relations between capital investment
and the manhour-output ratio. But it is hardly likely that
these are the only relevant factors. There are also modifica-
tions in factors other than capital investment, the efficiency
of the equipment in actual use, or the number of mainte-
nance workers. Among these are changes in the quality and
character of products as prices fall and rise; in managerial
efficiency with recession and recovery; and in labor's produc-
tivity as unemployment contracts or expands, as hours of
labor are cut or lengthened, and as labor organization waxes
and wanes. These and other changes, some peculiar to single
periods, others occurring in most business cycles, must be
analyzed before we can understand why the labor-output
ratio for all manufacturing industries combined behaves as it
does during short periods.17
SIGNIFICANCE OF THE DECLINE
IN UNIT LABOR REQUIREMENTS
The reduction of over two thirds in labor per unit of
product, measured in manhours, and of one half in terms of
men employed, reflects a very marked transformation in
17Itis conceivable that the cyclical fluctuations in the ratios for individual
manufacturing industries are much more consistent in behavior and extreme
in amplitude than the ratio for all factories combined. The average hides the
diverse movements characterizing individual industries; these may cancel one
another more completely in some cycles than in others, depending on the
shifting relative importance of each industry in the total. The evidence col-
lected in this study (Appendix F and Chart 12, below) goes little further than
to suggest that there is some industrial diversity of cyclical pattern and that
in a few industries there is fairly considerable amplitude of fluctuation. Here
too, however, the general impression is one of gradual decline with moderate
and random fluctuations, rather than of considerable and systematic varia-
tion about a downward trend. Our statistics tell us little about the consistency
of the cycles in labor per unit of output in individual industries. To study
these fluctuations adequately we should need extensive monthly data.24 MANUFACTURING EMPLOYMENT
manufacturing techniques, conditions of work, intensity of
labor effort, and material means of production. The indus-
trialist of 1899 would rub his eyes in amazement were he
suddenly set down in the United States of today. He would
find new materials, more and bigger machines, novel and
flexible sources of power, giant factories and nation-wide in-
dustrial networks, advanced mechanical, chemical, and elec-
trical processes, assembly lines speeding the flow of work,
intensified division of labor, and revised methods of labor
management. These and a host of other innovations and de-
velopments coincided with the dro.p in labor requirements
per unit of product, and many of them no doubt contributed
to that decline.
A few of the changes may be defined quantitatively, though
their influence is not subject to exact appraisal. For example,
the net book value of capital assets used in manufacturing
between 1904 (the earliest year for which we have data) and
1937 rose from $6 billion to almost $25 billion, or from
about $1,000 of capital assets per worker to over $2,000.
Price increases between 1904 and 1937 must have accounted
for a good part of this rise, but even after allowing for them
so far as we can, we find an increase of at least 30 percent in
the net value of capital instruments per worker.18
Again, the aggregate rated horsepower capacity of prime
movers and of electric motors driven by purchased energy
utilized in manufacturing plants increased from 10 million
in 1899 to over 50 million in 1939—a rate more than twice
as rapid as that at which employment in factories advanced.
As for the expansion in the scale of industrial operations,
with all that it implies with respect to specialization of in-
dustries, plants, and labor, the fourfold increase in output
serves as a rough measure of its scope.
Unfortunately there are direct and precise measures for
very few of the phenomenal developments in contemporary
18Thedata are presented and discussed in Appendix E.CHANGES IN THE AGGREGATE 25
manufacturing.'9 No information is available for years prior
to. about 1920 on such an important form of capital as manu-
facturing inventories, which amounted to over $12 billion
in 1937 (equal to 50 percent of the value of net capital as-
sets); yet inventories are in some degree substitutes for equip-
ment, particularly in meeting seasonal peaks in demand, and
they affect manhours per unit of output directly by enhanc-
ing the regularity of the flow of work.
As for the increased efficiency of labor itself, the one-third
drop in hours must have contributed to it, but this figure is
hardly an adequate gauge of the influence of the reduction
in the work week. The elimination, in large part, of the child
labor that was employed in 1899 is also a factor in greater
labor efficiency, yet its effect, too, is difficult to weigh quan-
titatively. In addition, of course, many of the important
changes are qualitative: revisions of plant layout; improve-
ments in equipment, notably increases in the size of ma-
chines; accelerated speed of operation; more precise control
devices; and less susceptibility to breakdown. Together with
air conditioning, improvements in lighting, elimination of
disturbing pillars, and other refinements in factory building
and design, these qualitative advances have been so revolu-
tionary that one might well venture the statement (though
it cannot be substantiated in quantitative terms) that they
have contributed as much to reducing unit labor require-
ments as has the growth in the physical stock of productive
instruments.
Confronted by this complex of influences which is beyond
synthesis or direct measurement, we must return to the ratio
of labor input to units of output as perhaps the simplest and
most readily computed single index of all the changes, large
19Asis noted in Appendix E, statements concerning changes in capital as-
sets must be accepted with caution. On the incommensurability of the horse-
power capacity of different types of engines and motors see W. L. Thorp,
"Horsepower Statistics for Manufactures," Journal of the American Statistical
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and small, that have shaped contemporary manufacturing
processes. Appraised either in terms of men or of manhours,
the decline in this ratio is the most telling measure of their
cumulative impact.
This complex effect should not be considered identical
with change in "efficiency," or with any other single aspect
of manufacturing development. If the reduction in labor
requirements per unit of product, whether calculated in
numbers employed or in hours worked, can be held to re-
flect a multitude of changes in the processes and means of
production, it cannot be regarded also as a measure of change
in the efficiency, amount or character of any one factor of
production. Those who consider the figures cited to be in-
dexes of labor efficiency, of quantity of capital invested, or
of improvement in capital equipment, are in effect ascribing
to one or another factor the result of changes in all factors.
For the same reason one cannot reasonably focus attention
exclusively on any one motivating force behind the far-reach-
ing changes measured by the decline in labor per unit. If we
stress management as their initiator we may underestimate
the other factors that must have stimulated management: for
example, trade union efforts to raise wage rates, and encour-
agement of standardization of products and regulation of
hours and conditions of labor by governmental agencies.
Sometimes, of course, a specific change in unit labor require-
ments may be accurately ascribed to some single factor; but
this is hardly true of changes in broad industrial categories
over long periods. And finally, developments in manufactur-
ing alone cannot account for the decline in its unit labor
requirements, for the latter reflects also changes in other
parts of the economy.20 The reduction in the utilization of
labor per unit of product in American factories since 1899
cannot be viewed, therefore, as the result of the operation of
20 See Chapter 6 for a discussion of the relation between developments in
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any one factor of production, or even of all the factors resi-
dent in manufacturing. It must be interpreted rather as re-
flecting, in, just one segment of our industry, the cooperative
action of all factors, both within manufacturing and out-
side it.